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Abstract: 
 This paper questions why the Third Republic of France imposed conscription on Muslim 
Algerians in 1912. This action is peculiar because conscription was a tenant of French citizenship, 
which the French thought that Muslim Algerians were too inferior to have. A politician named 
Adolphe Messimy, the members of the Third Republic in control of the government in 1912, and a 
group called the Young Algerians convinced France to contradict its laws and beliefs to impose 
conscription. They did so because the self-interests of all three groups met at one moment in time 
and wanted conscription. This paper meticulously explains the motives of Adolphe Messimy, the 
Third Republic, and the Young Algerians to explain why each agreed to conscription. This research 
fits into the broader schematic of French Algerian history because it argues that Algeria, in part, 
gained its independence in 1962 due to the imposition of conscription in 1912.  
 
Introduction: 
hen France invaded and colonized 
Algeria in 1830, the French 
government did not intend to immediately 
make the indigenous Muslim Algerians 
French citizens. Instead, France made them 
French subjects governed by both French and 
Koranic law. The French exempted Muslim 
Algerians from conscription. Conscription 
was a duty of French citizenship, and the 
French thought that Muslim Algerians were 
too inferior to be French citizens.1 However, 
in 1912, the French government imposed 
conscription on the Muslim Algerians, while 
still keeping their legal status as subjects of the 
French Empire. This research focuses on why 
the French government searched for 
loopholes in its own laws and contradicted its 
own beliefs in order to impose conscription. 
This paper discusses the way the French 
government imposed conscription on Muslim 
Algerians without granting them citizenship. 
It also examines how France refused to 
acknowledge the ideology of equality, liberty, 
                                                 
1 Edward Behr, The Algerian Problem (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, Inc., 1961), 30; Jacques Bouveresse, Un 
parlement colonial? Les Délégations financières algériennes 1898-1945: 
and fraternity for Muslim Algerians. With its 
colonies, France neglected to uphold the 
beliefs it had held in high regard since the 
French Revolution. This research adds to the 
discussion of colonial history because it 
demonstrates the contradictions of French 
colonial thought. France thought Muslim 
Algerians were too inferior to be citizens, but 
it conscripted them anyways. This research 
also explains how France dealt with these 
contradictory thoughts in order to achieve its 
aims. Adolphe Messimy (1869-1935), the 
Third Republic of France (1871-1940), and 
the Young Algerians (1907-c.1923) convinced 
France to impose conscription on Muslim 
Algerians in 1912 because of their respective 
self-interests. 
 
Historical Background: 
Under orders from Charles X of the 
Bourbon Restoration (1814-1830), France 
invaded Algeria in 1830. Charles X thought 
that the conquest of new territory would 
pacify France and prevent revolution, but it 
L’institution et les hommes (Mont-Saint-Aignan: Publications des 
Universités de Rouen et du Havre, 2008), 798. 
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did not work. 2 France conquered new 
territory, but Charles X lost his throne. Later, 
the French empire annexed Algeria in 1834, 
and then officially made it a part of the 
French administrative system in 1881.3 
Algerian resistance against the French 
takeover collapsed after 1860, except for a few 
major revolts in 1864, 1870, and 1871.4 The 
revolts of the nineteenth century remained in 
French memory for the remainder of French 
Algeria’s existence, and underpinned every 
official interaction between the imperial 
power and its colony after 1871. 
France designed Algeria as a settler 
colony. The French government encouraged 
European peasants to move there with 
promises of free grants of land; though, the 
government neglected to mention that it had 
taken the land from the indigenous Algerians. 
The French government ruled in Algeria only 
to satisfy the desires of the settlers, known as 
the colons. 5 Thus, it lost any respect from the 
average Muslim Algerian it may have received 
otherwise. The government also satisfied the 
colons by restricting Muslim Algerians to work 
only in the agricultural sector; whereas the 
colons were in charge of the industrial sector.6 
This policy allowed colons to prosper, while 
Muslim Algerians found themselves restricted 
economically and politically. 
The Ministry of the Interior in Paris 
appointed, at the top level, a Governor-
General, who governed Algeria. France 
divided the colony into three départements 
which corresponded to the three major cities: 
                                                 
2 Ferhat Abbas, Le Jeune Algérien (Paris: Éditions Garnier 
Frères, 1981), 11. 
3 Peter Dunwoodie, “Assimilation, Cultural Identity, and 
Permissible Deviance in Francophone Algerian Writing of the 
Interwar Years,” in Algeria & France, 1800-2000: Identity, 
Memory, Nostalgia, ed. Patricia M.E. Lorcin (Syracuse, New 
York: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 68. 
4 Anthony Clayton, The Wars of French Decolonization (Essex, 
England: Longman Group UK Limited, 1994), 26. 
5 Charles-Robert Ageron, Modern Algeria, trans. Michael Brett 
(London: Hurst and Company, 1991), 57 and 81. The settlers 
were from France, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Cyprus. 
Oran, Algiers, and Constantine. France then 
divided the départements into districts and 
county councils. The French government 
used a system of indirect rule, where French 
officials controlled the tribal chiefs who 
governed the Muslim Algerians.7 Each 
département only had one representative in the 
Chamber of Deputies in Paris. Muslim 
Algerians occupied about one third of the 
possible representative seats in their local 
governmental bodies, while colon 
representation made up the other two thirds.8 
The lack of representation added to the 
feeling that France ruled over every aspect of 
life for the Muslim Algerians. The French-
Algerian relationship was one of French 
dominance over the colonized. This is 
demonstrated by the French refusal to allow 
them any right to a say in their own 
governance. In 1913, Adolphe Messimy, who 
was the Minister of War at the time, summed 
up the governance of Algeria with the 
statement, “We do not govern the indigenous 
people, we command them.”9 
 
Being a Muslim in French Algeria: 
By the start of World War I, five million 
Muslims lived in Algeria.10 Only those Muslim 
Algerians who had applied for French 
citizenship were citizens.11 French law 
governed Muslim Algerians, but they had the 
right to be tried in Muslim courts for non-
criminal cases and the right to be governed by 
Koranic Law. These rights were known as the 
6 Behr, 34. 
7 Clayton, 27; Ageron, Modern, 29; Behr, 39-40. 
8 The Third Republic of France, La Loi du 9 décembre 1884, 
portant modification aux lois organiques sur l’organisation du Sénat et 
l’élection des Sénateurs; Cherif Benhablyès, L’Algérie française vue 
par un indigène (Algiers: Imprimerie Orientale Pontana Frères, 
1914), 119. 
9 Adolphe Messimy, Le Statut des Indigènes Algériens (Paris: 
Charles-Lavauzelle, 1913), 36. 
10 The term "Muslim Algerians" refers to the Arab and Berber 
populations in Algeria. 
11 Bouveresse, 797. 
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statut personnel.12 In the Sénatus-Consulté of July 
14, 1865, the French government decreed that 
Muslim Algerians were French subjects, and 
could only obtain French citizenship through 
an application process. There are important 
differences between being a subject and being 
a citizen. A French subject, in Algeria, was 
governed by both French and Koranic Law, 
but did not have the right to vote. A French 
citizen, on the other hand, was governed 
solely by French law, and all male citizens 
could vote. 
The Decree of October 24, 1870 and the 
Law of February 4, 1919 defined the 
application process for citizenship. The 
former said that the Muslim Algerian 
applicant must be twenty-one years old and 
must be able to produce a birth certificate to 
validate his age. The 1919 Law made the 
process for citizenship much more difficult. 
In addition to the 1870 Decree’s criteria, the 
applicant could obtain citizenship if he had 
never been hostile to France, if he served with 
distinction in the military, if he had a 
naturalized-indigenous parent, or if he held a 
public position in Algeria. The Law of 
February 4, 1919 also instructed the 
Governor-General to conduct an 
investigation to verify the information in the 
application. If the claims were true, the 
applicant would become a French citizen. 
However, the principal condition for 
obtaining French citizenship was to give up 
one’s right to the statut personnel. The average 
Muslim Algerian did not want to be French, 
and keeping the statut personnel allowed him 
not to be. Due to this sentiment, only thirteen 
hundred Muslim Algerians applied for 
citizenship by 1914, and, by 1936, only 
                                                 
12 Behr, 38. 
13 Todd Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian 
War and the Remaking of France (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2006), 27; Clayton, 27; Behr, 38. 
twenty-five hundred had applied out of a 
population of five million.13 
Muslim Algerians were the only 
indigenous group France barred from French 
citizenship. The French government had 
granted citizenship to Jewish Algerians, 
indigenous and colons, in 1870. Furthermore, 
the French colons and their descendants, 
known as pied-noirs, were guaranteed French 
citizenship at birth. France also automatically 
granted non-French European settlers 
citizenship. That left Muslim Algerians as the 
only population in the colony that did not 
automatically receive French citizenship at 
birth. They were the only group that had to 
apply for it individually. In contrast to the 
other groups, France did not grant Muslim 
Algerians citizenship because it saw them as 
inferior. They were inferior because they were 
not European and Christian. 
As part of their governing strategy, the 
French pursued a policy of assimilation. This 
was an imperial policy for justifying the 
occupation of Algeria by claiming that France 
was civilizing the indigenous population. 
Assimilation was the French colonial ideology 
that Muslim Algerians would eventually 
become culturally French through exposure to 
French settlers and French schooling. The 
principal example of assimilation was the city 
of Algiers where the Arab architecture of the 
Casbah mixed with the architecture of the 
French port.14 The French attempted to 
assimilate the population by requiring that 
Muslim children go to Arab-French schools, 
and by requiring that French be the official 
language of the colony.15 In France, children 
learned that Algeria had been a part of France 
since 1830 just like Brittany had been part of 
France since 1491.16 However, the 
14 Vincent Duclert, “La France Coloniale,”  in La République 
Imaginée: 1870-1914 (Paris: Belin Litterature et Revues, 2010), 
567. 
15 Ageron, Modern, 42. 
16 Behr, 38. 
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assimilation policies only worked on a small 
population of educated Muslim elite in 
Algeria. Some members of this elite formed 
the pro-French group called the Young 
Algerians. 
Despite the ideology of assimilation, the 
French still treated the Muslim Algerians as 
inferior subjects. Due to the Muslim Algerian 
revolts against France in 1870 and 1871, the 
French government introduced Le Code de 
l’indigénat in 1874, added to it in 1881, and 
modified it again in 1890.17 Le Code de 
l’indigénat gave the French officials in Algeria 
the power to fine or imprison Muslim 
Algerians without trial if they accused them of 
subverting law and order.18 Le Code highlights 
the repressive measures against Muslim 
Algerians, which affected seven to eight 
thousand Muslims each year. The Young 
Algerians made the dissolution of these 
repressive measures one of their conditions 
for accepting the imposition of conscription. 
 
Adolphe Messimy and the Third Republic: 
From 1871 to 1900, France rebuilt its 
army because it needed to remain a world 
power after the “cruel disasters of 1870-
1871,” meaning the Franco-Prussian War.19 
France was in the process of reforming its 
army at the turn of the century because a 
number of politicians –who were children 
during the Prussian defeat of France in 
1871— began to gain political power and 
were eyeing Germany with apprehension. 
Two such politicians were Adolphe Messimy 
and Raymond Poincaré, who were the 
                                                 
17 Jean-Claude Vatin, “L’Algérie des Français,” in L’Algérie 
Politique Historie et Société (Paris: Presses de la Fondation 
Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1938), 133. 
18 Ageron, Modern, 53. 
19 Joel A. Setzen, “Background to the French Failures of 
August 1914: Civilian and Military Dimensions,” Society for 
Military History 42, no. 2 (April 1928), 87; Raymond Poincaré, 
“Military Service,” in How France is Governed, trans. Bernard 
Miall (London: T. Fisher UnWin, 1913), 359. 
Minister of War and the president of France 
at the beginning of World War I, respectively. 
The Franco-Prussian War resulted in a 
defeat for France and the loss of the Alsace-
Lorraine territory to Germany. After this 
defeat, many politicians delivered anxious 
speeches about Germany, worried that it 
would invade again. Messimy himself wrote 
that the French military’s raison d’être was to be 
an instrument of vengeance against Germany. 
He wrote that if the French army was not 
reformed and another war with Germany 
occurred, France would lose disastrously.20 
Poincaré also reflected this sentiment by 
writing that a country must be ready to defend 
itself.21 Both gentlemen wanted a strong army 
to defend France against invasion from 
Germany. However, Messimy was the more 
vocal of the two because he had a plan to 
alleviate this fear. 
General Adolphe Messimy began his 
political career in 1902 as a representative for 
Paris in the Chamber of Deputies. He ended 
that same career as the Minister of War at the 
end of August 1914. He was the Secretary of 
the Naval Budget in 1903, the Secretary of the 
War Budget from 1905 to 1906, the Minister 
of the Colonies from March 1911 to June 
1911, and the Minister of War from June 1911 
to August 1914.22 Messimy’s work with the 
war budget and as the Minister of the 
Colonies persuaded him that Germany was a 
threat to France, and that Muslim Algerian 
conscripts could augment the French army. 
Imposing conscription on Muslim 
Algerians was not a new idea. Several generals 
and a commander had suggested imposing 
20 Adolphe Messimy, “Réorganisation nécessaire de L’Armée: 
Au Lendemain du Vote de la Loi de Deux Ans,” La Revue 
Socialiste 39, no. 234 (June 1904), 701 and 698. 
21 Poincaré, 355. 
22 “GEN. MESSIMY DIES,” The New York Times (New 
York), September 1, 1935; Charles-Robert Ageron, Les 
Algériens Musulmans et la France: Volume 2 (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1968), 1071-1072. 
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conscription in 1845, in 1857, in 1864, and in 
1881, but the government did not consider 
the idea viable until Messimy began proposing 
it in 1907.23 Known as Le Projet Messimy, 
Messimy’s plan was to conscript Muslim 
Algerians because he reasoned that Algeria 
could supply seventeen thousand soldiers to 
augment the army.24 Messimy supported his 
project by writing that France and its colonies 
could create a robust army, and easily surpass 
Germany in terms of manpower.25 Messimy’s 
fear of Germany invading again was his 
incentive for imposing conscription on 
Muslim Algerians. His fear explains why he 
continued pursuing the project until it came 
to fruition in 1912. 
In 1909, the Chamber of Deputies, the 
French legislative branch in France, started 
earnestly discussing conscription. Once 
Messimy pointed out that most of the 
objections to imposing conscription were 
coming from Germany, the military authority 
supported the plan.26 The discussion of Le 
Projet Messimy highlights the extent to which 
Messimy and the Third Republic feared 
Germany. It also emphasizes how both 
thought it was in their self-interest to prepare 
to counter any invasion from next door. In 
1911, a month after Messimy became the 
Minister of War, he attempted to create three 
battalions out of non-voluntary Muslim 
Algerians, but, since the Chamber of Deputies 
did not agree to this plan, the government 
stopped him.27 About six months later, the 
Third Republic released the Decree of January 
31, 1912, and then the Decree of February 3, 
1912. 28 Both imposed conscription and 
specified the method of recruitment for 
Muslim Algerians. On February 24, 1912, the 
                                                 
23 Bouveresse, 797; Messimy, Le Statut, 27. 
24 Bouveresse, 797. 
25 Adolphe Messimy, Notre Œuvre Colonial (Paris: E. Larose, 
1910), 49; Messimy, Réorganisation, 703. 
26 Ageron, Les Algériens, 1069-1070. 
27 Ibid., 1072. 
Governor-General of Algeria received 
instructions on how to implement the 
decrees.29  
Just like that, France implemented an idea 
that had been floating around since 1845 due 
to its anxiety over the rising, threatening, 
military presence just across its eastern 
border. Messimy’s and the Third Republic’s 
fear of another defeat if Germany decided to 
invade was their incentive for imposing 
conscription. However, the government in 
Paris did not discuss granting the Muslim 
Algerians citizenship in return for 
conscription. It is probable that Messimy and 
the government thought that the Muslim 
Algerians would not ask for any sort of 
compensation. They were wrong. 
 
The Young Algerians: 
According to Cherif Benhabylès, a 
member of the Young Algerians, the Decrees 
of January 31 and February 3, 1912 
“provoked a great emotion in all of Algeria.”30 
Ferhat Abbas, another Young Algerian, wrote 
that many resented the imposition of 
conscription because the French government 
asked Muslim Algerians to fight for French 
soil, which, for many, was a place they had 
never even seen.31 After the announcement of 
the decrees, many Muslim Algerians fled to 
places such as Syria in order to avoid being 
drafted.32 The historian does not explain why 
they chose to go to Syria. It is assumed that 
they saw Syria as a better place to live than 
French Algeria. The newspaper, Le Rachidi, 
echoed the anger of those who remained 
when it wrote, in response to the decrees, 
28 Bouveresse, 802; The Third Republic of France, Le décret du 
3 février 1912: Décret relatif au recrutement des indigènes algériens.  
29 Ageron, Les Algériens, 1073. 
30 Benhabylès, 117. 
31 Abbas, 38. 
32 Bouveresse, 799. 
 49 
“No military service without compensation.”33 
The acquisition of political compensation for 
military service would become the formal 
occupation of the Young Algerians. This was 
the root of their incentive to agree to accept 
conscription. 
In 1907, two assimilated Algerians known 
as Sadek Denden and Khélil Kaid Layoun 
founded the Young Algerians in Bône, 
Algeria. 34 Soon, the group grew throughout 
the colony to include other assimilated, 
culturally French, elite Muslim Algerians, such 
as Dr. Benthami Ould Hamida. Dr. Benthami 
studied in Montpellier and had obtained 
French citizenship in 1906 despite the 
rigorous bureaucratic application process. He 
then became a municipal counsellor in Algeria 
in 1908 and was re-elected in 1913. Lastly, he 
was the head of the Young Algerians 
sometime before the group faded out of 
existence in the 1920s.35  
The Young Algerians wanted the right to 
vote granted to all Muslim Algerians who had 
a French education. They were also in favor 
of assimilation. Lastly, they agreed with Le 
Projet Messimy because conscription would help 
to assimilate Muslim Algerians by making 
them, at least nominally, equal to their French 
counterparts.36 The principal goals of the 
Young Algerians were equality through 
political reform with the French and 
assimilation for all Algerians. These goals set 
the Young Algerians apart from the rest of 
the population because only French-educated 
Algerians wanted to become French. 
However, the rest wanted to remain Arab and 
wanted freedom from French occupation. 
On June 8, 1912, the Financial Delegation 
of Algeria voted to send a delegation of 
Young Algerians led by Dr. Benthami to Paris 
                                                 
33 Ageron, Les Algériens, 1041. 
34 David Prochaska, Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône, 
1870-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
232; Ageron, Modern, 77. 
35 Ageron, Les Algériens, 1049-1050. 
to demand political compensation for Muslim 
Algerians peacefully accepting conscription.37 
Messimy presented this delegation to a 
committee headed by Poincaré. The Young 
Algerians gave their demands, known as the 
Young Algerian Manifesto, to this delegation. 
They demanded raising the minimum age of 
conscription from eighteen to twenty-one, 
reforming the repressive regime against 
Muslim Algerians, actual representation for 
Muslim Algerians in the governments of 
Algeria and Paris, and equal taxation so that 
Muslim Algerians did not have to pay more 
than their French counterparts.38 Lastly, the 
Young Algerians asked the government to 
grant Muslim Algerians the rights of 
citizenship, such as the right to vote, without 
legally making them French citizens. This was 
attractive to Muslim Algerians because they 
were able to keep their statut personnel and 
experience the benefits of citizenship. These 
demands were given as part of the exchange 
between the Young Algerians, Messimy, and 
the Third Republic for Muslim Algerians to 
peacefully accept conscription.39 Though the 
Young Algerians did not threaten to revolt 
against the French, the fear that Algerians 
would revolt was always present in French 
minds. The angry reaction from Muslim 
Algerians to the decrees imposing 
conscription frightened the French. So, 
although the Young Algerian delegation never 
vocally threatened to revolt against the French 
government, there was a perceived 
threatening tone. 
Messimy made a special report to the 
Chamber of Deputies on July 2, 1912 asking 
the Chamber to accept the manifesto, while 
also insisting to the Young Algerian 
delegation that they peacefully accept military 
36 Prochaska, 233; Ageron, Modern, 77. 
37 Ageron, Les Algériens, 1041. 
38 Benhabylès, 118. 
39 Ageron, Les Algériens, 1042. 
 50 
service.40 The Third Republic then agreed to 
the Young Algerians’ demands. The 
government issued the Decree of September 
19, 1912, which removed the repressive 
administration measures, such as the Code de 
l’indigénat.41 It later issued the Law of July 15, 
1914 that planned to remove all repressive 
measures after five years, but it still allowed 
the French officials in Algeria to watch 
anyone who they thought were suspicious.42 
The demands were agreed to, but the 
government postponed implementing them 
until after World War I. For example, the 
government did not implement equal taxation 
until 1919, but then it ended this reform a 
year later.43 The Third Republic postponed 
granting Muslim Algerians the right to vote 
for over two decades. In 1936, it seemed likely 
that Muslim Algerian males would be granted 
the right to vote, but the bill was rejected. 
They did not secure the right to vote until 
their independence from France in 1962. 
The combined self-interests of Adolphe 
Messimy, the Third Republic, and the Young 
Algerians resulted in the imposition of 
conscription on Muslim Algerians and their 
acceptance of it. The fear of Germany by 
those in political power in France created the 
need to conscript Muslim Algerians, while the 
Young Algerians used this need to achieve 
some political reforms. France imposed 
conscription on Muslim Algerians, but it did 
not grant them full French citizenship, per the 
Young Algerians’ request. This was because 
the French thought that Muslim Algerians 
were inferior and the Young Algerians knew 
that Muslim Algerians would not accept 
conscription if they had to give up their statut 
personnel. The decision not to grant full 
citizenship is extraordinary because the 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 1075 and 1045. 
41 Bouveresse, 803. 
42 Ageron, Modern, 78; Bouveresse, 796. 
43 Ageron, Modern, 73 and 80. 
44 Messimy, Le Statut, 9. 
French government achieved its interest of 
augmenting the army, and the Muslim 
Algerians were promised the political rights of 
French citizenship without being forced to 
give up their right to be governed by Koranic 
Law. It is also astonishing that the Young 
Algerians had equalized, at least on paper, the 
Muslim Algerians and the French. The 
imposition of conscription seemed to have 
benefitted everyone. At least, so it seemed in 
1912. 
 
World War I: 
According to Messimy, conscription 
incorporated 2000 Muslim Algerians into the 
army by 1913 on the contingent that there 
would be 45,000 young men fit for service 
each year after.44 However, the other sources 
consulted do not confirm if this occurred. By 
August 1, 1914, about 4000 conscripts were in 
the army. They were called tirailleurs, meaning 
infantrymen, in order to differentiate them 
from the French troops.45 When World War I 
began in August 1914, Germany invaded 
France and nearly made it to Paris. France 
managed to hold off Germany, but the price 
was a standstill on the Western Front with 
trench lines rarely moving for the next four 
years. 
The sources consulted do not say if any of 
the Young Algerians served in the war. Even 
so, Algeria provided a total of 173,000 
soldiers, including Muslim Algerians and pied-
noirs. However, it is not discernible as to how 
many died. Charles-Robert Ageron, the 
premier historian of French Algeria, says that 
about 25,000 Muslim Algerians died, while 
Ferhat Abbas, a Young Algerian and an 
Algerian nationalist, claimed that 80,000 
died.46 Abbas also claimed that Algeria sent 
45 Ageron, Les Algériens, 1077; Charles-Robert Ageron, Historie 
de l’Algérie Contemporaine: Volume II (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1979), 256. Tirailleurs refer to the 
infantrymen from the French African colonies. 
46 Ageron, Modern, 78; Abbas, 38. 
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250,000 men, both Muslim and pied-noir, to the 
war, so his numbers are most likely wrong. 
Abbas is also probably wrong because his 
claim came from a political essay that he 
wrote with the purpose of demonstrating 
French mistreatment of Muslim Algerians. 
This bias probably contributed to inaccuracy 
in his estimations. 
Despite the discrepancy in statistics, dying 
in a war fought to defend France’s liberty 
scarred the Muslim Algerians. France 
demanded that its colonial troops defend the 
liberties of the right to vote, the right to equal 
representation, equality, and fraternity.  
France and other European powers denied 
these liberties to their colonial subjects. 
Forcing colonial troops to fight for liberties 
that they did not have was one of the reasons 
for the birth of nationalist and anti-colonial 
movements in the mid-twentieth century. 
Messimy’s military career in World War I 
was short-lived. He was the Minister of War 
at the start of the war, and tried to speed up 
the mobilization of colonial troops to counter 
the rapidly advancing German army.47 
Unfortunately for him, the Third Republic 
removed him from office because it made him 
the scapegoat for the failure of the French 
strategic plan (Plan XVII) to stop the 
Germans. As some form of compensation, 
the government gave him command of the 
162nd Infantry Division, which he held until 
1919.48 He appears to have removed himself 
from the political sphere after the war because 
he did not hold an elected office after 1919. 
Messimy was one of the driving forces for 
imposing conscription, but his participation in 
the government diminished after passing the 
Decrees of January 31 and February 3, 1912. 
World War I ended with a victory for the 
Third Republic over Germany. However, it 
                                                 
47 Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: The 
MacMillan Company, 1962), 149-150. 
48 “GEN. MESSIMY DIES.” 
ended in a loss for the Young Algerians, who 
disappeared as a group by 1923. The Young 
Algerians disappeared because only one 
demand from their Manifesto was met. The 
group demonstrated that reform was almost 
impossible. The group dissolved because 
Algerians started to become discontented with 
a French regime that would not reform, 
despite a colonial delegation asking it 
diplomatically to through its own imperial 
language. France attempted equal taxation in 
1919, but then terminated the policy in 1920.49 
The Third Republic reintroduced Le Code de 
l’indigénat in 1920 and made it more repressive 
in 1922. 50 This demonstrates the failure of the 
Young Algerians to make France stop its 
oppressive measures against Muslim 
Algerians. The Young Algerians failed to 
achieve their goals of giving Muslim Algerians 
the political rights of French citizenship. Even 
worse, the application process to become a 
citizen became more restrictive with the 
introduction of the Law of February 4, 1919. 
This restriction aided in the dissolution of the 
Young Algerians because the law dissuaded 
people from wanting to become French. This 
was because becoming a French citizen was 
no longer worth the effort the application 
process took. It also added to Algerian 
discontent with the French regime and with 
the Young Algerians for failing to achieve any 
sort of reform through nonviolent protest. 
“It is evident that the long battle of 
Messimy had only succeeded in a mediocre 
result and the conscripts were not yet even a 
handful,” Ageron argues.51 Ageron claims that 
Le Projet Messimy had a mediocre result 
because France only conscripted about five 
thousand Muslim Algerians out of a 
population of five million. However, I argue 
that Le Projet Messimy did not succeed because 
49 Ageron, Modern, 73 and 80. 
50 Ageron, Modern, 80. 
51 Ageron, Les Algériens, 1077. 
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it cannot be determined if the addition of 
Muslim Algerians to the French army actually 
helped France during the war. I think that 
France and Germany would have been at a 
near standstill no matter how large their 
respective armies were. This is because the 
military commanders did not account for the 
tactics of trench warfare and modern 
weaponry to result in mass slaughter, nor did 
they change their strategies in the face of this 
killing. The military commanders continued to 
command their soldiers to charge at the 
enemy’s trench, which responded with 
machine gun fire. This strategy resulted in 
massive causalities, but the commanders did 
not stop making their soldiers charge. It is 
possible that if both France and Germany had 
smaller armies, the war would have ended 
sooner. No one else would have been left to 
throw at the enemy to die in no man’s land. 
The Third Republic betrayed both 
Messimy and the Young Algerians after 
imposing conscription. Messimy was the 
scapegoat for the government because Plan 
XVII did not prevent the German army from 
besieging Paris in the first few weeks of the 
war. The Third Republic removed him from 
political power, and then he retired from 
politics after 1919. The Young Algerian 
delegation led by Dr. Benthami left Paris in 
1912, assured that its Manifesto’s demands 
would be met. Save for one, they were not. 
The Third Republic did not seriously 
implement any of the promised political 
reforms, except for the trial run of equal 
taxation, but even that only lasted a year. The 
Third Republic did not grant the political 
rights of citizenship to Muslim Algerians. 
Thus, it seemed that peaceful talks could not 
bring about reform nor equality. 
Nonetheless, the Young Algerian 
delegation achieved something remarkable. 
They explained their concerns and demands 
to their imperial power by using the legal 
language of France. Even more extraordinary, 
the members of the imperial government 
listened to the delegation, instead of 
dismissing and ignoring it. However, France 
did not implement the promised reforms. 
This failure of the Third Republic to keep 
promises demonstrated to Algerians that 
peaceful protests could not create reform, let 
alone equality for Muslim Algerians. 
Military service in World War I 
profoundly affected the Muslim Algerians. 
The 1920s saw the creation of anti-colonial 
and nationalistic movements in nearly all of 
the colonies that had served in the war, no 
matter to which empire the colony belonged. 
The colonies after both world wars changed 
because they had seen the supposedly-
superior and civilized Europeans slaughter 
each other. Significantly, the imperial powers 
told the colonial troops that they were 
fighting to defend the liberties that the powers 
denied to them. These three things were the 
basis for the anti-colonial movements and 
decolonization that occurred in the mid to 
late-twentieth century. The anti-colonial 
movement in Algeria, known as the Front de 
Libération Nationale (FLN), used armed 
resistance against France starting in the 1950s. 
This led to the bloodiest instance of 
decolonization in Africa, known as the 
Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962). 
In 1958, in the middle of the war, France 
granted Muslim Algerians, as a whole, 
unconditional French citizenship. It was too 
little, too late. In 1962, Algeria achieved its 
independence from France due to the FLN’s 
effective guerrilla warfare. The FLN owed its 
creation to the experiences of those who had 
fought in the world wars, which occurred en 
masse due to Messimy, the Third Republic, and 
the Young Algerians imposing conscription 
on Muslim Algerians in 1912. 
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